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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(U) or (E)  
B7C, NARS, Date 5/22/24

Subject: Proposed changes in President's message to Khrushchev

The following amendments to the President's message to Khrushchev (October 20 draft) are proposed.

Change 1. Page 1, para 1, second sentence, change as follows:

"A copy of this statement is enclosed."

Reason: To provide for transmittal of message itself to Soviet Ambassador in Washington, in order to allow more advance notice to Khrushchev than if message delivered through our Ambassador in Moscow.

Change 2. Page 2, para 2, third sentence. Change "long-range" to "offensive."

Reason: To avoid Soviet quibbling over definition of "long-range".

Change 3. Page 2, para 2, after third sentence, ending "has proceeded", insert following:

"For your information, let me add that we have complete knowledge of these developments. Such actions on the part of the Soviet Union are particularly grave in light of the demonstrated irresponsibility and emotional instability of Premier Castro."

Reason: To emphasize completeness of our knowledge, in order to undercut <sup>→ Castro, to signify, despite later claim and our own earlier deployment,</sup> any Soviet disposition to argue for defensive nature of their action. Also, by refusing

Change 4. Page 2, para 2, begin new paragraph, with a change as follows, in the sentence beginning "I must tell you":

"I must tell you that in this case your government has miscalculated and that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere be removed."

Reason: To use language leaving open an option to Soviets to remove offensive weapons, rather than implying that only way of removal would be by U. S. unilateral action.

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Change 5. Page 2, at end of the new paragraph, after "on your part", add:

"I should inform you further that I have already ordered that the following precautionary measures be taken:

- a. Increase the alert status of the U. S. Strategic Air Command.
- b. Establish a naval and air patrol of the Cuban coast.
- c. Reinforce the garrison at the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
- d. Initiate evacuation of U. S. dependents from the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

Reason: To strengthen point concerning seriousness with which we view situation, and at same time to minimize possibility that Soviets would misinterpret the implementation of these measures as going beyond a minimum response to the Cuban buildup.

Change 6. Page 3, at end of paragraph, add following:

"I would also hope to receive from you prior to the time of my speech a communication which would indicate your willingness to arrange for immediate removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, in order that I can publicly state to the people of the United States and the world that a satisfactory resolution of this crisis is in prospect."

Reason: To strengthen President's position of having exhausted all reasonable avenues of approach to the problem, and to provide an opportunity to Khrushchev - in the event he has seriously underestimated U. S. reaction - to initiate withdrawal before public announcement has made any drawing back altogether unfeasible.